College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Supreme Court Preview

Conferences, Events, and Lectures

2012

Section 2: Roberts Court
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School

Repository Citation
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School, "Section 2: Roberts Court" (2012). Supreme Court Preview. 13.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview/13

Copyright c 2012 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview

II. Roberts Court
In This Section:
Featured Articles:
"SPLIT DEFINITIVE"

p.38
p.38

Lawrence Baum and Neal Devins
"CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS AND THE CHANGING CONSERVATIVE LEGAL
MOVEMENT"

p.41

Joel Alicea

"No RESPITE FOR LIBERALS"
Pamela Karlan

p.45

"COURT UNDER ROBERTS Is MOST CONSERVATIVE IN DECADES"

p.48

Adam Liptak
"JUSTICE KAGAN-GIVING LIBERALS A RHETORICAL LIFT"

p. 55

Joan Biskupic
"CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS AND HIS ApOLOGISTS"

p.59

John Yoo
"ENUMERATING CONSERVATISM'S LONG-TERM VICTORY"

p.62

George F. Will
"CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS SIGNALS THAT SUPREME COURT REMAINS
IND EPEND ENT"

p.64

David G. Savage
"THE MYSTERY OF JOHN ROBERTS"

p.66

Linda Greenhouse
"ROBERTS SENT MESSAGE OF COURT'S LEGITIMACY"

p.69

Dan Balz
"CONSTITUTION CHECK: WHAT DOES "CHIEF" IN "CHIEF JUSTICE" MEAN?"

p. 71

Lyle Denniston

37

"Split Definitive"
Slate
November 11, 2011
Lawrence Baum and Neal Devins
For the first time in a century, the Supreme
Court is divided solely by political party.
All eyes are on the Supreme Court this week
as it considers what to do with the landmark
lawsuits challenging President Obama's
health care legislation. While the question
that intrigues court watchers is whether the
nine justices will transcend their reputations
as liberals or conservatives, it is a littlenoticed irony that, for the first time in more
than a century, the ideological positions of
the justices on today's Supreme Court can
be identified purely by party affiliation.
What that means is that, for the first time in
our political lifetimes, each of the four
Democratic appointees has a strong
tendency to favor liberal outcomes, while
the five Republicans typically take
conservative positions.
The days of liberal Republicans and
conservative Democrats are behind us, and
the days of judicial moderates from either
party may soon seem a relic of the past.
What does that mean for the future of the
Affordable Care Act, and for the court
itself?
This change has been brewing for some
time, but with the August 2010 confirmation
of Elena Kagan to succeed liberal
Republican John Paul Stevens, the deal was
sealed. In its 2010-11 term, the Court
divided along partisan lines to a striking
degree. An unusually high propOliion of
cases (18 out of 75) were decided by 5-4
votes on at least some portion of the
outcome (or 5-3, with Justice Elena Kagan
recused because of her work as solicitor

general). In 12 of those cases, including
many of last term's most impOliant rulings,
the court's Republicans were all arrayed on
one side, its Democrats on the other. These
cases involved regulation of campaign
funding the right to sue for violations of
rights by a prosecutor's office, and state
powers
to
enforce
restrictions
on
immigration.
Far more telling, George W. Bush's and
Barack Obama's appointees are patiicularly
likely both to agree with each other and
disagree with the other pair. According to
data compiled by the SCOTUS Blog,
Obama nominees Kagan and Sonia
Sotomayor voted together 94 percent of the
time last term; Bush nominees Samuel Alito
and Chief Justice John Roberts were aligned
96 percent of the time. By contrast, these
two pairs disagreed with each other more
than 30 percent of the time overall (an
extremely high percentage considering that
more than 60 percent of the decisions were
either unanimous or 8-1).
Justice Anthony Kennedy, a Ronald Reagan
appointee, is generally thought of as the
"swing" justice on the coUti, one who stands
between the four justices to the left of him
and the four to his right. That depiction of
Kennedy is basically accurate. Last term,
Kennedy was in the majority in all but two
of the Court's 5-4 decisions. But that doesn't
mean Kennedy stood equidistant from the
Court's liberals and conservative blocs. His
rates of agreement on the Court's judgment
in the 2010 term ranged from 83 percent to
90 percent with the other four Republicans;
his rates of agreement with the Democrats
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ranged from 66 percent to 74 percent.
At one level, none of this seems very
surprising. We have become accustomed to
a political world that features strong
polarization between the parties. Congress is
sharply and bitterly divided along partisan
lines, and President Obama has achieved
little success in winning Republican votes
for his major initiatives. Why should the
Supreme Court be any different? But that
obscures the fact that, at least until last year,
the Supreme Court was different. The cOUli
has often featured close divisions between
ideological factions, but those divisions have
usually crossed party lines rather than
following them. Going back at least as far as
the late 19th century, there has never been
another year on the court like the 2010 term,
when there was a contingent of Republican
conservatives on one side and a contingent
of Democratic liberals on the other side.
Indeed, what's striking is how far the cOUli
has departed from this sort of paliisan
polarization. The "Four Horsemen" who
regularly voted to strike down New Deal
legislation in the 1930s included a
Democrat-Woodrow Wilson appointee
James McReynolds-and the three justices
who most regularly opposed those men
included two Republican appointeesHarlan Fiske Stone and Benjamin Cardozo.
In the famously "liberal" Warren Court of
the 1950s and 1960s, which adopted a wide
array of new rules expanding legal
protections for civil liberties, two of the
leaders in that effort were selected by
President Eisenhower-William Brennan
and Chief Justice Earl Warren himself. For
their part, the justices who questioned much
of the court's civil liberties revolution at that
time included FDR appointee Felix
Frankfurter and, later, Kennedy appointee
Byron White.

As the court gradually moved to the right
beginning in the 1970s, White abetted much
of that effOli while Republican appointees
such as John Paul Stevens, David Souter,
and (in the later portion of his career) Harry
Blackmun stood in the liberal opposition,
while other Republicans such as Sandra Day
O'Connor and Lewis Powell took relatively
moderate positions.
What, then, brought about the partisan court
of the 2010 term? The simple answer is
changes in the selection process of justices.
From the 1940s until the election of Ronald
Reagan, the political parties were anything
but polarized. Conservative Southern
Democrats
and
liberal
Rockefeller
Republicans were important counterweights
within both parties. Indeed, George Wallace
justified his third-party bid for president in
1968 by saying that "there's not a dime's
wOlih of difference between the Democrat
and Republican parties."
Supreme Court appointments reflect these
larger trends. Before party polarization took
hold, ideology was not the controlling factor
in court appointments. Presidents gave
attention to other considerations, such as
rewarding political allies, appealing to
voters, and avoiding confirmation battles in
the Senate. For those reasons, Democratic
presidents have often selected justices who
turned out to be conservative, and a good
many Republican appointees turned out to
be liberal.
President Harry Truman's choices of
relatively conservative nominees reflected
his interest in rewarding political associates
rather than choosing reliable liberals. And
President Eisenhower's choices of Warren
and Brennan resulted largely from political
(but not ideological) considerations. Warren
helped Eisenhower secure the 1952

39

Republican
presidential
nomination;
Brennan was appointed to the court's socalled Catholic seat because Eisenhower
wanted to appoint a Democrat to
demonstrate his ability to transcend political
partisanship. Kennedy appointed White, his
deputy attorney general and a longtime
supporter (dating back to White's writing
the intelligence report on the sinking of a
boat piloted by Kennedy during World War
II). Richard Nixon, although criticizing
Warren court criminal justice rulings,
discounted ideology in his efforts to appoint
a Southerner to the court. Gerald Ford's
appointment of John Paul Stevens was
directly linked to Watergate and Ford's need
to rise above politics.
This pattern continued even as the larger
political system was becoming more
polarized. Strongly conservative Ronald
Reagan chose relatively moderate Sandra
Day O'Connor because there was only a
small pool of credible Republican women
from whom to choose. More striking,
Reagan Attorney General Edwin Meese
thought
the
pool
of conservative
Republicans so weak that he set about to
devise strategies to deepen that pool for
future presidents.
Today,
appointment
strategies
have
changed. As politics has become even more
polarized, presidents have given greater
emphasis to the goal of choosing
ideologically reliable justices. More than
anything, Republican presidents are now
under great pressure to appoint true blue
conservatives. From 1969 to 1991, even
though Republicans appointed 12 justices
(and Democrats none), the court frequently
backed liberal outcomes. By 2001, when
George W. Bush became president, the
rallying call of conservative Republicans
was "No More Souters." Indeed, when Bush

initially chose Harriet Miers for what
became Alito's seat, vehement criticism
from conservatives who doubted her
ideological reliability figured into Miers'
decision to quickly withdrew, underlining
changes in the political atmosphere.
For their part, Bill Clinton and Barack
Obama have contributed to the court's
partisan divides by nominating four liberals
to the court. And while some Democratic
pmtisans lament that these justices are
nothing like earlier liberals such as William
Brennan or Thurgood Marshall, it is
nonetheless true that today's Democratic
nominees are distinctly to the left of all their
Republican colleagues.
All this could change. But it's unlikely
unless and until pmtisan polarization
declines. Future appointments, like the most
recent ones, will emphasize ideological
reliability over anything else. And because
presidents will look for nominees whose
ideological views are deeply rooted, the
justices who are selected will be less likely
to move toward moderation after they join
the court.
The court's strong polarization does not
necessarily mean that the justices will divide
strictly along partisan lines when they
address the constitutional challenge to the
healthcare law. Even on politically
controversial issues, the court frequently
depmts from such paltisan divisions. But
because the COUlt is now composed solely of
Democratic
liberals
and
Republican
conservatives, decisions that follow partisan
lines have become far more likely. If this
situation continues, as we think it will, the
most powerful effects may be on how
Americans think about the Supreme Court as
an institution.
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"Chief Justice Roberts and the Changing
Conservative Legal Movement"
The Witherspoon Institllte
July 10, 2012
Joel Alicea
The clash between Chief Justice Robe11s'
opinion and that of the joint dissenters is
best seen as a clash between two visions of
judicial restraint, and two eras of the
conservative legal movement.
At the sprightly age of 57 and less than
seven years into his term as chief justice,
John Roberts looks like a man whom time
has left behind. The reaction among legal
conservatives to the Roberts opinion in
National
Federation
of Independent
BlIsinesses v. Sebelills (the healthcare case)
has been brutal. Many have accused the
chief justice of exchanging the black robes
of the jurist for the trappings of the
politician. The chief justice is said to have
"blinked" and "failed [his] most basic
responsibility." Noted originalist scholar
Mike Rappaport strongly implied that
Robe11s is "both a knave and a fool." The
cataloguing could go on.
As much as these reactions reveal about
differing views on a hotly contested question
of constitutional law, they are at least as
interesting because of what they say about
the state of the conservative legal
movement. Today's legal conservatives
view the chief justice'S opinion as judicial
abdication, but it was not too long ago that
the philosophy reflected in Roberts' opinion
would have been conservative orthodoxy.
The truth is that the conservative legal
movement's conception of judicial restraint
has changed, departing from the view it held
when it emerged from the constitutional
wilderness to which it had been banished
during the Warren Court. NFIB v. Sebelills

displays a conservative legal movement in
transition-and one that is increasingly
leaving the judicial restraint in Roberts'
opinion behind.
Roberts lays down a theory of judicial
restraint early in his opinion. Quoting his
nineteenth-century brethren, the chief justice
states: "'Proper respect for a co-ordinate
branch of the government' requires that we
strike down an Act of Congress only if 'the
lack of constitutional authority to pass [the]
act in question is clearly demonstrated. '"
Justice John Marshall Harlan eloquently
voiced this view of judicial restraint in his
dissent in Lochner v. New York (1905).
Harlan argued that a statute must be "plainly
and palpably unauthorized by law" to be
held
unconstitutional.
One
of the
Progressive Movement's titanic figuresFelix Frankfurter-would adopt this as his
mantra and carry it onto the Supreme Court.
There he would watch his fellow New Deal
justices turn against the principle preached
by anti-Lochner jurists for a generation. By
the time Frankfurter retired in 1962, the
Warren Com1's revolution in constitutional
law was well under way.
It was precisely this revolution that inspired
a counterrevolution: the conservative legal
movement. Robert Bork's 1971 Indiana Law
Journal article calling for a jurisprudence of
"neutral principles" and a return to the
intentions of the Founders raised the banner
around which modern originalism was
formed. The standard was taken up a few
years later by then-Justice Rehnquist in his
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lecture "The Notion of a Living
Constitution," and soon the prolific Raoul
Berger had entered the fray with his book
Government by Judiciary. The movement
achieved major success with dizzying speed
when Ronald Reagan was elected president
and his attorney general, Edwin Meese,
oversaw fundamental change in the federal
judiciary.
Of course, original ism was not-and is
not-the entirety of the conservative legal
movement. There has always been a vocal
libertarian element, especially with the rise
of the law and economics movement.
Similarly, there has been a strain of legal
conservatism that rejects originalism on the
one hand and libertarian ideology on the
other. But when it comes to constitutional
interpretation, original ism has been the
default theory of legal conservatism, and it
is appropriate to look at how original ism
developed for insight into the broader
movement.
As Princeton professor Keith Whittington
has explained, the conservative legal
movement of the early years was "reactive"
and "motivated by substantive disagreement
with the recent and then-current actions of
the Warren and Burger courts." As such,
"the primary commitment within this critical
posture was to judicial restraint."
This was the restraint of Harlan's Lochner
dissent resurrected, with its emphasis on
deference to legislative majorities. Bork
made the connection between the Warren
Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecticut
and the Lochner Court's infamous opinion
quite explicit, as did Rehnquist. The call for
a judiciary that was deferential to legislative
enactments was a theme of this period.
All that soon began to change. Scholars
began to place less emphasis on the judicial

restraint of Bork and Rehnquist. It was not
so much that judicial restraint lost pride-ofplace in originalist theory as much as the
of restraint
transformed.
conception
Whittington captured this new way of
thinking about restraint in his book
Constitutional Interpretation: "An originalist
Court may well find itself quite active in
striking down legislation at odds with the
clear requirements of the inherited text.
Originalism requires deference only to the
Constitution and to the limits of human
knowledge,
not
to
contemporary
politicians."
From this perspective, judicial restraint
entails adherence to the original meaning: no
more but also no less. Stare decisis might
have a role to play, depending on one's
theory of original ism, but generally if the
originalist judge thinks a statute is
unconstitutional, he has an obligation to
strike it down. A judge that adopts the
attitude of Justice Harlan-waiting until a
is
"plainly
and
palpably"
law
unconstitutional-is
too
likely
to
subordinate the Constitution to the errant
of
today's
self-interested
judgment
legislators.
That is not to say that this new view of
judicial restraint amounted to judicial
"activism" or disregarded the respect due to
the political branches. The difference was
one of emphasis: how far should a judge go
to uphold a statute at the risk of deforming
the Constitution? The new view thought
Justice Harlan went too far. The old judicial
restraint was dismissed, in the words of
Whittington, as "judicial passivism."
Judicial restraint used to mean that a judge
should bend over backwards to avoid
striking down a law, and this view was once
widely held within the conservative legal
community. But this idea has long since
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faded from the scene, and judicial restraint is
less likely to be thought of by today's legal
conservatives as coinciding with judicial
nonintervention. How many statutes the
COUli strikes down is simply beside the
point for today's legal conservative; the
question is why the Court shuck down the
statutes that it did.
And so we arrive at NFIB v. Sebeli1ls. The
chief justice's opinion displays a clear
embrace of the old judicial restraint. He
announces
that
"every
reasonable
construction must be resorted to, in order to
save a statute from unconstitutionality."
Although the joint dissenters would likely
agree with this principle, the key word is
"reasonable." The Justice Harlan conception
of judicial restraint leads Roberts to stretch
the language of the statute far beyond what
the dissenters believe is reasonable-or
indeed constitutional.
Roberts first analyzes the individual
mandate under the commerce and necessary
and proper clauses of the Constitution and
concludes that it cannot be upheld on those
grounds. Writing for the Court, the chief
justice invokes the canon of constitutional
avoidance quoted above, requiring the
justices to adopt "every reasonable
construction" to avoid striking down the
statute. Roberts proceeds to hold that the
health care law does not impose a legal
mandate to purchase health insurance.
Rather, he reinterprets the statute as levying
a tax on those who fail to acquire insurance,
which he holds was a constitutional exercise
of Congress's taxation power.
The chief justice's opinion is full of
acknowledgments that his interpretation is a
creative one. He sets the bar low for
constitutionality by saying that "the question
is not whether that is the most natural
interpretation of the mandate, but only

whether it is a 'fairly possible' one." He
concedes that "the statute reads more
naturally as a command to buy insurance
than as a tax," that it "states that individuals
'shall' maintain health insurance," and that
"the most straightforward reading of the
mandate is that it commands individuals to
purchase insurance." Yet, despite these
interpretive data-and a good deal more, as
the dissenters point out-the chief justice
concludes that the insurance requirement
can be justified as a tax.
The reason Roberts does so is that his view
of judicial restraint in NFIB v. Sebelius
requires him to go to the limits of
plausibility to save the statute. The
dissenters, who express a different view of
restraint, refuse to go that far.
The old conception of judicial restraint is
evident in the chief justice's theme that the
Court is a legal-rather than politicalbody. At the beginning of his opinion, he is
at pains to state: "We do not consider
whether the Act embodies sound policies.
That judgment is entrusted to the Nation's
elected leaders. We ask only whether
Congress has the power under the
Constitution to enact the challenged
provisions." Then, at the conclusion, almost
identical language: "But the Court does not
express any opinion on the wisdom of the
Affordable
Care
Act.
Under
the
Constitution, that judgment is reserved to
the people." Like the legal conservatives of
the 1970s, the Roberts opinion emphasizes
the modesty of the judicial role and the
impOliance of deferring to legislative
majorities.
Just as the old theory of judicial restraint
came under intellectual attack, so too does
Roberts' opinion for the Court-and for the
same reasons. The problem with the old
theory of judicial restraint, so the critique
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goes, is that in straining to sustain the will of
today's fleeting majority, a judge may
ignore a fairly clear constitutional command
from the original popular sovereign: the
people who enacted the Constitution. The
more recent idea of restraint sees the old
way as a straightforward abdication of a
judge's duty to safeguard the limits of
political power.
Where a law is
unconstitutional, it must be declared so, and
the judge who contOlis a law to save it is
viewed as engaging in the very activism he
disclaims.
This contemporary view of judicial restraint
is on full display in the joint dissent. The
four justices lambast the Roberts opinion:
"The Court regards its strained statutory
interpretation as judicial modesty. It is not.
It amounts instead to a vast judicial
overreaching." In a fascinating peroration,
the dissenters appeal to the same values
underlying the old version of judicial
restraint, but they see it better expressed in
their own willingness to jettison the
health care law entirely:
The values that should have determined our
course today are caution, minimalism, and
the understanding that the Federal
Government is one of limited powers. But
the Court's ruling undermines those values
at every turn. In the name of restraint, it
overreaches. In the name of constitutional
avoidance, it creates new constitutional
questions. In the name of cooperative
federalism, it undermines state sovereignty.

The clash between the chief justice's
opinion and that of the joint dissenters is
therefore best seen as a clash between two
visions of judicial restraint, and two eras of
the conservative legal movement.
Of course, Robelis and the joint dissenters
have nuanced views on judicial restraint,
and NFIB v. Sebelills does not define those
views. Justice Scalia has long advocated
judicial modesty and deference to legislative
majorities, as seen in his dissent in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey (1992), and the chief
justice joined the Court's opinion in Citizens
United v. FEC (2010) in the face of heated
political opposition. The point here is simply
to identify the tensions within the
conservative legal movement evident in the
NFIB opinions.
The overwhelmingly negative response to
the chief justice's analysis shows just how
far the movement has distanced itself from
the old theory of restraint, embracing instead
a view that cares less about how many
statutes are struck down than about why
they are invalidated. For the chief justice,
his opinion is the epitome of judicial
modesty. For the dissenters, it is the height
of judicial arrogance. Roberts thinks his
actions are compelled by respect for the
coordinate branches of government; the
dissenters see his actions as flouting the
Constitution that called that government into
being. And at this moment in the history of
the conservative legal movement, Roberts
stood alone.
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"No Respite for Liberals"
The New York Times
June 30, 2012
Pamela S. Karlan
Anton Chekhov once remarked that "one
must not put a loaded rifle on the stage if no
one is thinking of firing it." In the term that
ended last week, the Supreme Court reached
a liberal outcome in cases involving
President Obama's health care law,
Arizona's draconian immigration statute and
mandatory life sentences for juveniles. But
the conservative majority also laid down a
cache of weapons that future courts can use
to attack many of the legislative
achievements of the New Deal and the Great
Society-including labor, environmental,
civil rights and consumer protection lawsand to prevent new progressive legislation.
Far from being a source of jubilation, the
term may come back to haunt liberals.
The immediate result of Thursday's 5-to-4
health care ruling was a victory for the
Obama administration and the millions of
Americans who will get improved access to
medical care. But four justices would have
struck down every provision of the 900plus-page act, and Chief Justice John G.
Roberts Jr., who provided the fifth vote to
uphold the mandate that individuals buy
insurance or. pay a penalty, distanced
himself from the law. "It is not our job," he
wrote, "to protect the people from the
consequences of their political choices." The
chief justice, who at 57 is likely to sit on the
court for at least another two decades, made
clear that government's ability to address
many ofthe nation's most pressing problems
is subject to some new limitations.
We take for granted that the federal
government can forbid landlords to reject a

tenant based on his race or religion; prohibit
development on fragile wetlands; finance
the Medicare program for the elderly;
require public schools to give girls an equal
opportunity to play sports; collect revenue to
pay for the National Institutes of Health and
the national parks; encourage energy
conservation by taxing gas guzzlers; prohibit
discriminatOlY voter ID laws; and vindicate
the right of state government employees to
take unpaid leave to care for sick relatives.
The conservative legal movement has
already attacked many of these provisions,
and the Roberts comi has been steadily
supplying it with ammunition to do so.
Conservative judicial rhetoric-for example,
Justice Antonin Scalia's denunciation last
week of the Obama administration's
decision not to deport young, law-abiding
illegal immigrants who came to this country
as children-may be designed to change the
political climate as well.
The federal government's ability to regulate
economic and social life stems largely from
four powers in the Constitution. Under the
commerce clause, Congress can "regulate"
national economic activity. Under the taxing
power, it can "lay and collect Taxes." Under
the spending power, it can "provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the
United States." And under the enforcement
it
can
enact
"appropriate
powers,
to
enforce
the
14th
legislation"
Amendment's equal protection and due
process clauses and the 15th Amendment's
guarantee of the right to vote regardless of
race.
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From the 1930s through the Warren and
Burger courts, the Supreme Court largely
deferred to the political branches' judgments
about the scope of these powers; it was their
partner, not their adversary. The court
recognized-as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
pointed out in her opinion on the health care
case-that the political process was the
pnmary vehicle for limiting government's
powers.
Under the last chief justice, William H.
Rehnquist, the court began to turn,
patiicularly on Congress's commerce and
enforcement powers. The comi limited some
statutes-notably, a section of the
Americans With Disabilities Act that
allowed state workers to sue their employers
and a section of the Violence Against
Women Act that gave victims of gendermotivated violence the right to sue in federal
court-but upheld others, including other
applications of the disabilities law, a
provision of the Family and Medical Leave
Act, and a statute criminalizing possession
of homegrown marijuana.
The Roberts comi has intensified the effort
to reduce federal power. That the individual
mandate was upheld should not overshadow
the court's ruling on Medicaid expansionthe part of the ruling that is most likely to
affect other legislation in the near future.
For the first time since the New Deal, the
court struck down an exercise of Congress's
spending power. It held that Congress
lacked the power to deny Medicaid funds to
states that refuse to expand their coverage.
Chief Justice Roberts-joined by the liberal
justices Stephen G. Breyer and Elena
Kagan-held that while the government can
deny additional Medicaid funds to states that
refuse to expand their coverage, it cannot
penalize them by rescinding current
Medicaid payments.

This is a loaded gun indeed.
Many state and local governments,
universities and nonprofit agencies build
their operations around federal financing. If
the federal government can deny them
additional money only when it adds
conditions the recipients must meet, it will
be hamstrung in ensuring compliance with
critical federal objectives. For example, the
government gives grants on the condition
that recipients will not discriminate on the
basis of race, sex and disability. If Congress
adds sexual orientation to the list-which
seems likely at some not-too-distant pointmust it maintain existing financing for
III
groups
that
defiantly
persist
discriminating against lesbians and gay
men?
A 2000 law requires state prisons and local
jails that get federal funds to accommodate
inmates' religious practices. But those
facilities received money long before the
law was passed. Can the government
credibly threaten to cut off funds to facilities
that violate the law, or are its enforcement
tools now limited?
In less-noticed opinions, the court also
curbed federal power in important ways. It
rejected the government's view that drug
company representatives should be entitled
to oveliime under the Fair Labor Standards
Act. It seemed poised to severely restrict
Congress's ability to give private plaintiffs
the right to enforce consumer protection
laws, unless they could show direct
economic injury. (On the final day of the
term, the court said it wouldn't decide the
case after all.)
In another health care case, the comi refused
to permit state workers to sue for violations
of their right to take sick leave for
themselves under the Family and Medical
46

Leave Act. A 5-to-4 majority ignored
evidence that although the act uses a genderneutral leave model, it was designed in
significant part to protect childbearing
women against pervasive employment
discrimination.
In the fall, the court will have fUliher
opportunities to advance the conservative
agenda. It will almost celiainly decide cases
involving voting rights, race-conscious
affirmative action and same-sex marriage.
Three cases involving federal environmental
law are already on the docket. And even
before the court struck down Montana's
century-old ban on corporate political
spending, there were already a slew of new
challenges to campaign finance regulations
working their way toward the court.
What, then, to make of the cOUli's landmark
decision to uphold the individual mandate?
Chief Justice Roberts construed the mandate
not as a requirement that individuals

purchase health insurance but as a choice:
buy insurance or pay a tax. But the
conservatives surely know that a Congress
that can tax but not do much else-spend
money, regulate the economy or enforce
civil rights-will be hamstrung. Taxes are
unpopular and nearly every Republican
member of Congress has promised to oppose
any additional taxes on individuals or
businesses.
A Congress that can advance national
priorities only through its taxing power is a
Congress with little power at all. That is the
real legacy of the last term. The Supreme
Court has given Americans who care about
economic and social justice a reason to
worry this Fourth of July. The court's guns
have been loaded; it only remains to be seen
whether it fires them.

Pamela S. Karlan is a professor of public
interest law at Stanford and a co-author of
"Keeping Faith With the Constitution. "
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"Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decades"
The New York Times
July 24,2010
Adam Liptak
When Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and
his colleagues on the Supreme Court left for
their summer break at the end of June, they
marked a milestone: the Roberts court had
just completed its fifth term.
In those five years, the court not only moved
to the right but also became the most
conservative one in living memory, based on
an analysis of four sets of political science
data.
And for all the public debate about the
confirmation of Elena Kagan or the addition
last year of Justice Sonia Sotomayor, there is
no reason to think they will make a
difference in the court's ideological balance.
Indeed, the data show that only one recent
replacement altered its direction, that of
Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. for Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor in 2006, pulling the
cOUli to the right.
There is no similar switch on the horizon.
That means that Chief Justice Roberts, 55, is
settling in for what is likely to be a very long
tenure at the head of a cOUli that seems to be
entering a period of stability.
If the Roberts court continues on the course
suggested by its first five years, it is likely to
allow a greater role for religion in public
life, to permit more participation by unions
and corporations in elections and to
elaborate further on the scope of the Second
Amendment's right to bear arms. Abortion
rights are likely to be curtailed, as are
affirmative action and protections for people
accused of crimes.

The recent shift to the right is modest. And
the cOUli's decisions have hardly been
uniformly conservative. The justices have,
for instance, limited the use of the death
penalty and rejected broad claims of
executive power in the government's efforts
to combat terrorism.
But scholars who look at overall trends
rather than individual decisions say that
widely accepted political science data tell an
unmistakable story about a notably
conservative court.
Almost all judicial decisions, they say, can
be assigned an ideological value. Those
favoring, say, prosecutors and employers are
said to be conservative, while those favoring
criminal defendants and people claiming
discrimination are said to be liberal.
Analyses of databases coding Supreme
Court decisions and justices' votes along
these lines, one going back to 1953 and
another to 1937, show that the Roberts court
has staked out territory to the right of the
two conservative courts that immediately
preceded it by four distinct measures:
In its first five years, the Roberts court
issued conservative decisions 58 percent of
the time. And in the term ending a year ago,
the rate rose to 65 percent, the highest
number in any year since at least 1953.
The courts led by Chief Justices Warren E.
Burger, from 1969 to 1986, and William H.
Rehnquist, from 1986 to 2005, issued
conservative decisions at an almost
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indistinguishable rate-55 percent of the
time.
That was a sharp break from the court led by
Chief Justice Earl Warren, from 1953 to
1969, in what liberals consider the Supreme
Court's golden age and conservatives
portray as the height of inappropriate
judicial meddling. That court issued
conservative decisions 34 percent of the
time.
Four of the six most conservative justices of
the 44 who have sat on the court since 1937
are serving now: Chief Justice Robelis and
Justices Alito, Antonin Scalia and, most
conservative of all, Clarence Thomas. (The
other two were Chief Justices Burger and
Rehnquist.) Justice Anthony M. Kennedy,
the swing justice on the current comi, is in
the top 10.
The Roberts court is finding laws
unconstitutional and reversing precedenttwo measures of activism-no more often
than earlier courts. But the ideological
direction of the court's activism has
undergone a marked change toward
conservative results.
Until she retired in 2006, Justice O'Connor
was very often the court's swing vote, and in
her later years she had drifted to the centerleft. These days, Justice Kennedy has
assumed that crucial role at the court's
center, moving the court to the right.
Justice John Paul Stevens, who retired in
June, had his own way of tallying the court's
direction. In an interview in his chambers in
April, he said that everyone of the 11
justices who had joined the court since 1975,
including himself, was more conservative
than his or her predecessor, with the possible
exceptions of Justices Sotomayor and Ruth
Bader Ginsburg.

The numbers largely bear this out, though
Chief Justice Roberts is slightly more liberal
than his predecessor, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, at least if all of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's 33 years on the court, 14 of
them as an associate justice, are considered.
(In later years, some of his views softened.)
But Justice Stevens did not consider the
question difficult. Asked if the replacement
of Chief Justice Rehnquist by Chief Justice
Roberts had moved the court to the right, he
did not hesitate.
"Oh, yes," Justice Stevens said.
The Most Significant Change
"Gosh," Justice Sandra Day O'Connor said
at a law school forum in January a few days
after the Supreme Court undid one of her
major achievements by reversing a decision
on campaign spending limits. "I step away
for a couple of years and there's no telling
what's going to happen."
When Justice O'Connor announced her
retirement in 2005, the membership of the
Rehnquist court had been stable for 11
years, the second-longest stretch without a
new justice in American history.
Since then, the pace of change has been
dizzying, and several justices have said they
found it disorienting. But in an analysis of
the court's direction, some changes matter
much more than others. Chief Justice
Rehnquist died soon after Justice O'Connor
announced that she was stepping down. He
was replaced by Chief Justice Roberts, his
former law clerk. Justice David H. Souter
retired in 2009 and was succeeded by Justice
Sotomayor. Justice Stevens followed Justice
Souter this year, and he is likely to be
succeeded by Elena Kagan.
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But not one of those three replacements
seems likely to affect the fundamental
ideological alignment of the court. Chief
Justice Rehnquist, a conservative, was
replaced by a conservative. Justices Souter
and Stevens, both liberals, have been or are
likely to be succeeded by liberals.

It is easy to forget that Justice Alito was Mr.
Bush's second choice. Had his first
nominee, the apparently less conservative
Harriet E. Miers, not withdrawn after a
rebellion from Mr. Bush's conservative
base, the nature of the Roberts court might
have been entirely different.

Justices' views can shift over time. Even if
they do not, a justice's place in the court's
ideological spectrum can move as new
justices arrive. And chief justices may be
able to affect the overall direction of the
court, notably by using the power to
determine who writes the opinion for the
court when they are in the majority. Chief
Justice Robetis is certainly widely viewed as
a canny tactician.

By the end of her almost quarter-century on
the court, Justice O'Connor was without
question the justice who controlled the result
in ideologically divided cases.

But only one change-Justice Alito's
replacement of Justice O'Connor-really
mattered. That move defines the Roberts
coUti. "That's a real switch in terms of
ideology and a switch in terms of outlook,"
said Lee Epstein, who teaches law and
political science at Northwestern University
and is a leading curator and analyst of
empirical data about the Supreme Court.
The point is not that Justice Alito has turned
out to be exceptionally conservative, though
he has: he is the third-most conservative
justice to serve on the court since 1937,
behind only Justice Thomas and Chief
Justice Rehnquist. It is that he replaced the
more liberal justice who was at the
ideological center of the COUti.
Though Chief Justice Robetis gets all the
attention, Justice Alito may thus be the
lasting triumph of the administration of
President George W. Bush. He thrust Justice
Kennedy to the court's center and has
reshaped the future of American law.

"On virtually all conceptual and empirical
definitions, O'Connor is the court's centerthe median, the key, the critical and the
swing justice," Andrew D. Matiin and two
colleagues wrote in a study published in
2005 in The North Carolina Law Review
ShOlily
before
Justice
O'Connor's
retirement.
With Justice Alito joining the court's more
conservative wing, Justice Kennedy has now
unambiguously taken on the role of the
justice at the center of the court, and the
ideological daylight between him and
Justice O'Connor is a measure of the
Robetis court's shift to the right.
Justice O'Connor, for her part, does not
name names but has expressed misgivings
about the direction of the court.
"If you think you've been helpful, and then
it's dismantled, you think, 'Oh, dear,'" she
said at William & Mary Law School in
October in her usual crisp and no-nonsense
fashion. "But life goes on. It's not always
positive. "
Justice O'Connor was one of the authors of
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,
a 2003 decision that, among other things,
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upheld restrictions on campaign spending by
businesses and unions. It was reversed on
that point in the Citizens United decision.
Asked at the law school forum in January
how she felt about the later decision, she
responded obliquely. But there was no
mistaking her meaning.
"If you want my legal opinion" about
Citizens United, Justice O'Connor said,
"you can go read" McConnell.

The Court Without O'Connor
The shift resulting from Justice O'Connor's
depaIiure was more than ideological. She
brought with her qualities that are no longer
represented on the court. She was raised and
educated in the West, and she served in all
three branches of Arizona's government,
including as a government lawyer, majority
leader of the State Senate, an elected trial
judge and an appeals court judge.
Those
expenences
informed
Justice
O'Connor's sensitivity to states' rights and
her frequent deference to political
judgments. Her rulings were often pragmatic
and narrow, and her critics said she engaged
in split-the-difference jurisprudence.
Justice Alito's background is more limited
than Justice O'Connor's-he worked in the
Justice Department and then as a federal
appeals court judge-and his rulings are
often more muscular.
Since they never sat on the court together,
trying to say how Justice O'Connor would
have voted in the cases heard by Justice
Alito generally involves extrapolation and
speculation. In some, though, it seems plain
that she would have voted differently from
him.

Just weeks before she left the cOUli, for
instance, Justice O'Connor heard arguments
in H1Idson v. Michigan, a case about
whether evidence should be suppressed
because it was found after Detroit police
officers stormed a home without announcing
themselves.
"Is there no policy protecting the
homeowner a little bit and the sanctity of the
home from this immediate entry?" Justice
O'Connor asked a government lawyer.
David A. Moran, a lawyer for the defendant,
Booker T. Hudson, said the questioning left
him confident that he had Justice
O'Connor's crucial vote.
Three months later, the court called for
reargument, signaling a 4-to-4 deadlock
after Justice O'Connor's departure. When
the 5-to-4 decision was announced in June,
the cOUli not only ruled that violations of the
knock-and-announce rule do not require the
suppression of evidence, but also called into
question the exclusionary rule itself.
The shift had taken place. Justice Alito was
in the majority.
"My 5-4 loss in H1Idson v. Michigan," Mr.
Moran wrote in 2006 in Cato Supreme COUli
Review, "signals the end of the Fourth
Amendment"-protecting
against
unreasonable searches-"as we know it."
The depaIiure of Justice O'Connor very
likely affected the outcomes in two other
contentious areas: abortion and race.
In 2000, the court struck down a Nebraska
law banning an abortion procedure by a vote
of 5 to 4, with Justice O'Connor in the
majority. Seven years later, the court upheld
a similar federal law, the Partial-Birth
Abortion Act, by the same vote.
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"The key to the case was not III the
difference in wording between the federal
law and the Nebraska act," Erwin
Chemerinsky wrote in 2007 in The Green
Bag, a law journal. "It was Justice Alito
having replaced Justice O'Connor."
In 2003, Justice O'Connor wrote the
majority opinion in a 5-to-4 decision
allowing public universities to take account
of race in admissions decisions. And a
month before her retirement in 2006, the
comi refused to hear a case challenging the
use of race to achieve integration in public
schools.
Almost as soon as she left, the court
reversed course. A 2007 decision limited the
use of race for such a purpose, also on a 5to-4 vote.
There were, to be sure, issues on which
Justice Kennedy was to the left of Justice
O'Connor. In a 5-to-4 decision in 2005
overturning the juvenile death penalty,
Justice Kennedy was in the majority and
Justice O'Connor was not.
But changing swing justices in 2006 had an
unmistakable effect across a broad range of
cases. "O'Connor at the end was quite a bit
more liberal than Kennedy is now,"
Professor Epstein said.
The numbers bear this out.
The Rehnquist court had trended left in its
later years, issuing conservative rulings less
than half the time in its last two years in
divided cases, a phenomenon not seen since
1981. The first term of the Roberts court
was a sharp jolt to the right. It issued
conservative rulings in 71 percent of divided
cases, the highest rate in any year since the
beginning of the Warren court in 1953.

Judging by the Numbers
Chief Justice Roberts has not served nearly
as long as his three most recent
predecessors. The court he leads has been in
flux. But five years of data are now
available, and they point almost uniformly
in one direction: to the right.
Scholars quarrel about some of the
methodological choices made by political
scientists who assign a conservative or
liberal label to Supreme Court decisions and
the votes of individual justices. But most of
those arguments are at the margins, and the
measures are generally accepted in the
political science literature.
The leading database, created by Harold 1.
Spaeth with the support of the National
Science Foundation about 20 years ago, has
served as the basis for a great deal of
empirical research on the contemporary
Supreme Court and its members. In the
database,
votes
favoring
criminal
defendants,
unions,
people
claiming
discrimination or violation of their civil
rights are, for instance, said to be liberal.
economIC
Decisions
striking
down
regulations and favoring prosecutors,
employers and the government are said to be
conservati ve.
About 1 percent of cases have no ideological
valence, as in a boundary dispute between
two states. And some concern multiple
issues or contain ideological cross-currents.
But while it is easy to identify the occasional
case for which ideological coding makes no
sense, the vast majority fit pretty well. They
also tend to align with the votes of the
justices usually said to be liberal or
conservative.
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Still, such coding is a blunt instrument. It
does not take account of the precedential
and other constraints that are in play or how
much a decision moves the law in a
conservative or liberal direction. The mix of
cases has changed over time. And the
database treats every decision, monumental
or trivial, as a single unit.
"It's crazy to count each case as one," said
Frank B. Cross, a law and business professor
at the University of Texas. "But the problem
of counting each case as one is reduced by
the fact that the less-important ones tend to
be unanimous."
Some judges find the entire enterprise
offensive.
"Supreme
Court
justices
do
not
acknowledge that any of their decisions are
influenced by ideology rather than by
neutral legal analysis," William M. Landes,
an economist at the University of Chicago,
and Richard A. Posner, a federal appeals
court judge, wrote last year in The Journal
of Legal Analysis. But if that were true, they
continued, knowing the political party of the
president who appointed a given justice
would tell you nothing about how the justice
was likely to vote in ideologically charged
cases.
In fact, the correlation between the political
party of appointing presidents and the
ideological direction of the rulings of the
judges they appoint is quite strong.
Here, too, there are exceptions. Justices
Stevens and Souter were appointed by
Republican presidents and ended up voting
with the court's liberal wing. But they are
gone. If Ms. Kagan wins Senate
confirmation, all of the justices on the comi
may be expected to align themselves across

the ideological spectrum in sync with the
party of the president who appointed them.
The proposition that the Roberts comi is to
the right of even the quite conservative
courts that preceded it thus seems fairly well
subject to
established.
But it IS
qualifications.
First, the rightward shift is modest.
Second, the data do not take popular
attitudes into account. While the court is
quite conservative by historical standards, it
is less so by contemporary ones. Public
opinion polls suggest that about 30 percent
of Americans think the current court is too
liberal, and almost half think it is about
right.
On given legal issues, too, the court's
decisions are often closely aligned with or
more liberal than public opinion, according
to studies collected in 2008 in "Public
Opinion and Constitutional Controversy"
(Oxford University Press).
The public is largely in sync with the court,
for instance, in its attitude toward
abortion-in favor of a right to abortion but
sympathetic to many restrictions on that
right.
"Solid majorities want the court to uphold
Roe v. Wade and are in favor of abortion
rights in the abstract," one of the studies
concluded. "However, equally substantial
majorities favor procedural and other
restrictions, including waiting periods,
parental consent, spousal notification and
bans on 'patiial birth' abOliion."
Similarly, the public is roughly aligned with
the court in questioning affirmative action
plans that use numerical standards or

53

preferences while approving those that allow
race to be considered in less definitive ways.

laws-I5 m its first five years, or three a
year.

The Roberts court has not yet decided a
major religion case, but the public has not
always approved of earlier rulings in this
area. For instance, another study in the 2008
book found that "public opinion has
remained solidly against the comi's
landmark decisions declaring school prayer
unconstitutional. "

It is the ideological direction of the

In some ways, the Robelis court is more
cautious than earlier ones. The Rehnquist
court struck down about 120 laws, or about
six a year, according to an analysis by
Professor Epstein. The Roberts comi, which
on average hears fewer cases than the
Rehnquist court did, has shuck down fewer

decisions that has changed. When the
Rehnquist court struck down laws, it
reached a liberal result more than 70 percent
of the time. The Roberts court has tilted
strongly in the opposite direction, reaching a
conservative result 60 percent of the time.
comi
overruled
45
The
Rehnquist
precedents over 19 years. Sixty percent of
those decisions reached a conservative
result. The Roberts court overruled eight
precedents in its first five years, a slightly
lower annual rate. All but one reached a
conservative result.
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"Justice Kagan-Giving Liberals a Rhetorical Lift"
Reuters
April 5,2012
Joan Biskupic

During three days of arguments over the
Obama healthcare plan, Supreme Court
Justice Elena Kagan put on a display of
rhetorical firepower, reinforcing predictions
that the newest liberal justice is best
equipped to take on the conservative, fiveman majority controlling the bench.
The strong views and persuasive tactics of
the administration's former top lawyer could
affect the fate of the health care overhaul, as
well as decisions in other ideologically
charged issues that will come before the
court, such as same-sex marriage.
Kagan's sturdy advocacy was evident to law
professors and to lawyers who practice
before the court during her first term. But
the health care debate has offered her a more
prominent platform with bigger stakes. She
pressed her argument as ardently as any
lawyer who stepped to the lectern.
At the final seSSIOn on the final day of
arguments,
attorney
Paul
Clement,
representing 26 states challenging the
healthcare law, had barely uttered three
opening sentences when Kagan pounced.
What followed was one of the most
aggressive exchanges of the entire three
days. It centered on a provision expanding
eligibility for Medicaid, the joint statefederal program that pays for poor people's
healthcare. Kagan tried to puncture
Clement's argument that bringing more
people into the program would impinge on
states' sovereignty and further strain their
budgets, even though the government would
pick up 90 percent of the cost.

The justice and the lawyer-Kagan a former
solicitor general for Obama, Clement for
George W. Bush-went at it for several
minutes. When Clement eluded her, Kagan
posed trickier scenarios to test the notion
that states are trapped in a program that
funnels hundreds of billions of dollars their
way yet consumes significant state funds,
too.
"Wow! Wow!" Kagan exclaimed in
disbelief,
as
Clement rejected her
hypothetical offers of huge sums of money,
which she posited anyone would accept. The
money would not be attractive, Clement
responded, if it "came from my own bank
account. And that's what's really going on
here, in part."

GROUNDBREAKER, BUT IN A NEW
ERA

The exchange illuminated how Kagan,
President Barack Obama's second Supreme
Court appointee, who joined the bench in
August 2010, has energized the fourmember liberal wing of the nine-member
court. A keen strategist, she can also match
wits with Chief Justice John Roberts and
Antonin
Scalia,
the
longest-serving
conservative on today's bench.
Her role is distinct from that of Justice
Anthony Kennedy, the conservative who is
most likely to swing and occasionally permit
the other side to prevail. Rather than casting
a crucial vote, she lends a critical voice that
could make the case for liberals within the
court and beyond.
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Her approach, seen in her early months and
brought vividly to the fore during the
health care case, suggests she may be
adopting some of the liberal passion of her
mentor, Thurgood Marshall, for whom she
clerked. He also served as a solicitor
general, during the Lyndon Johnson
administration, before becoming the first
African-American justice on the high court.
Marshall, whose tenure spanned 1967-1991,
was, with the late Justice William Brennan,
a standard-bearer for a liberalism that has all
but disappeared from the federal bench.
They opposed the death penalty in every
case, consistently boosted defendants' rights
and favored broad-scale solutions for past
racial discrimination. They sought to give
judges a strong hand in remedying social
policy disputes.
Kagan is unlikely to embrace that activism
of a bygone era. Yet her approach could lead
her to oppose efforts by the conservative
majority to reverse past rulings on racebased remedies, or break new ground on gay
rights.

IDEOLOGICALLY CHARGED CASES
Kagan's fiercest dissenting opinions on
behalf of the liberals have so far come in
ideologically charged cases. In an Arizona
campaign finance dispute, she wrote that
while the conservative majority said it had
found the "smoking guns" at the center of
the case, "the only smoke here is the
majority's, and it is the kind that goes with
mirrors."
"It is absolutely clear. She is positioned to
be the leader on the liberal side," said
Harvard University law professor Mark
Tushnet. "It was incredible," he said of the
exchange with Clement. "She was just not

going to let him go. She had the questions
all set up."
In the months preceding the court's
health care hearing, conservative groups and
prominent Republicans, including Senate
Republican Leader Mitch McConnell,
questioned whether Kagan should sit on the
case because she had worked as a high-level
lawyer under Obama when the healthcare
law and strategy for its defense was being
developed.
The overhaul, which includes a mandate that
most Americans buy insurance by 2014, is
intended to bring coverage to more than 32
million uninsured people in the United
States.
Kagan testified during her summer 2010
confirmation hearings that she did not work
on healthcare litigation, and administration
officials have since said she was walled off
from discussions on how to defend the law.
Challengers say Congress exceeded its
constitutional authority with the mandate
and Medicaid expansion.
Chief Justice Robelis implicitly backed
Kagan and Justice Clarence Thomas on
January 1 when he wrote in an annual report
on the judiciary: "I have complete
confidence in the capability of my
colleagues to determine when recusal is
warranted." Liberal groups had urged
Thomas not to sit, because his wife,
Virginia, a Tea PaIiy activist, has opposed
the healthcare law.

HUNTING
PHEASANT
CRACKING WISE

AND

If anyone had thought Justice Kagan might
pull her punches during arguments because
of the criticism she faced for not recusing
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herself, they were wrong. She defended the
Obama heaIthcare plan with a vigor that
might have been expected if she were still
Obama's first solicitor general.
"I was surprised that she didn't try to seem a
little more balanced. She was certainly up
there with her perspective," said Carrie
Severino, a former law clerk to Thomas who
is chief counsel of the Judicial Crisis
Network, a conservative advocacy group
that focuses on legal issues and was one of
the organizations that had questioned
Kagan's participation in the case.
Kagan, who declined to be interviewed for
this story, has made friends with colleagues
on both sides. The Manhattan native, who as
dean of the Harvard law school brought in
more conservative professors to a campus
dominated by liberals, has taken up skeet
shooting and pheasant hunting with Scalia,
her ideological opposite.
For all her toughness with attorneys who
stand before the cOUli, Kagan is also mindful
of her place. Last week she was cut off by
senior justices and had forgotten her
question by the time her turn came. Quipped
the court's newest appointee: "See what it
means to be the junior justice?"
The views she has brought to the court are
not lost on fellow liberals, particularly
veteran Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who
since her own 1993 appointment has
witnessed the conservative takeover of the
court.
Ginsburg has praised Kagan's rhetorical
skills and "powerful" and "forceful"
opinions-and her use of humor. In a speech
in New York last July, Ginsburg cited
Kagan's bench reading of one of her first
court opinions. "If you understand anything

I say here, you will likely be a lawyer, and
you will have had your morning cup of
coffee." The daughter of a lawyer and a
school teacher, Kagan became the first
woman to hold the post of solicitor general
when President Obama selected her in 2009.
She had never argued a case before the court
but, with her background in the classroom
and navigation of campus politics, she
swiftly proved herself a daunting presence.
Her style is one of concise, declarative
sentences.
Representing the Obama administration at
the lectern, she sometimes clashed with
Chief Justice Roberts. In a case involving
potentially competing stances within the
Department of Justice, he called her
argument "absolutely startling." Kagan
stood her ground: "The United States
government is a complicated place."
She has also expressed respect for Roberts.
Referring to his years as an appellate lawyer,
she referred to him as "the great Supreme
Court advocate of his time."
STANDOUT DISSENTS

In her first full term, Kagan aligned herself
most with Obama's only other appointee.
According to figures compiled by the
SCOTUSblog, a site now partially
sponsored by Bloomberg Law, she voted
with Sonia Sotomayor 94 percent of the
time, with Ginsburg 91 percent, and Stephen
Breyer, the fOUlih liberal justice, 87 percent.
She was least in accord with Justice
Thomas, at 66 percent.
More than her votes, it is her opmlOnsmainly in dissent-that have made her stand
out. She took the lead to protest a 5-4
decision in an Arizona case allowing state
tax credits that benefited religious schools,
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insisting the decision "damages one of this
nation's
defining
constitutional
commitments," that of religious liberty.
On the last day of the 2010-11 term, Kagan
led dissenters in a separate hot-button
Arizona case, as the majority invalidated a
state law that gave extra funding to political
candidates who used the public-finance
system rather than relied on private backers.
Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the majority.
The dueling opinions revealed the energetic
style of the two young leaders: He is 56, she
turns 52 this month. When Kagan wrote that
challengers to the Arizona law showed
"chutzpah," Roberts countered, "The charge
is unjustified." As much as they both
employed long citations of law and
precedent, they also used punchy two-word
sentences. One of his: "Not so." One of hers:
"Me too."
SPEAKER FOR THE LEFT
Last week's healthcare arguments, testing
Obama's major domestic achievement,

illustrated Kagan's robust approach and her
potential to speak for the left.
She jumped in when administration lawyers
faltered, responded to conservative justices'
questions about the Obama position, and
came on strong when Clement was at the
lectern.
During arguments over the new insurance
mandate, premised on the notion that
everybody will eventually need medical
care, the lead lawyer for the state
challengers said: "The government can't say
that everybody is in that (healthcare) market.
The whole problem is that everybody is not
in that market, and they want to make
everybody get into that market."
Kagan replied: Wasn't that "cutting the
baloney thin? Health insurance exists only
for the purpose of financing healthcare. The
two are inextricably interlinked. We don't
get insurance so that we can stare at our
insurance certificate. We get it so that we
can go and access healthcare."

58

"Chief Justice Roberts and His Apologists"
The Wall Street JOllrnal
June 29,2012
John Yoo

White House judge-pickers sometimes ask
prospective nominees about their favorite
Supreme Court justice. The answers can
reveal a potential judge's ideological
leanings without resorting to litmus tests.
Republican presidential candidates similarly
promise to appoint more judges like so-andso to reassure the conservative base.
Since his appointment to the high court in
2005, the most popular answer was Chief
Justice John Roberts. But that won't remain
true after his ruling on Thursday in NFIB v.
Sebelills, which upheld President Barack
Obama's signature health-care law.
Justice Roberts served in the Reagan Justice
Department and as a White House lawyer
before his appointment to the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme
Court by President George W. Bush. Yet he
joined with the court's liberal wing to bless
the greatest expansion of federal power in
decades.
Conservatives are scrambling to salvage
something from the decision of their oncegreat judicial hero. Some hope Sebeli1ls
covertly represents a "substantial victory,"
in the words of conservative columnist
George Will.
After ail, the reasoning goes, Justice
Roberts's opinion declared that the
Constitution's Commerce Clause does not
authorize Congress to regulate inactivity,
which would have given the federal
government a blank check to regulate any
and all private conduct. The court also
decided that Congress unconstitutionally

coerced the states by threatening to cut off
all Medicaid funds if they did not expand
this program as far as President Obama
wants.
All this is a hollow hope. The outer limit on
the Commerce Clause in Sebelills does not
put any other federal law in jeopardy and is
undermined by its ruling on the tax power
(discussed
below).
The
limits
on
congressional coercion in the case of
Medicaid may apply only because the
amount of federal funds at risk in that
program's expansion-more than 20% of
most state budgets-was so great. If
Congress threatens to cut off 5%-10% to
force states to obey future federal mandates,
will the cOUli strike that down too?
Doubtful.
Worse still, Justice Roberts's OpInIOn
provides a constitutional road map for
architects of the next great expansion of the
welfare state. Congress may not be able to
directly force us to buy electric cars, eat
organic kale, or replace oil heaters with solar
panels. But if it enforces the mandates with
a financial penalty then suddenly, thanks to
Justice Roberts's tortured reasoning in
Sebeli1ls, the mandate is transformed into a
constitutional exercise of Congress's power
to tax.
Some conservatives hope that Justice
Roberts is pursuing a deeper political game.
Charles Krauthammer, for one, calls his
opinion "one of the great constitutional
finesses of all time" by upholding the law on
the narrowest grounds possible-thus doing
the least damage to the Constitution-while
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turning aside the Democratic
partisan attacks on the court.

Party's

The comparison here is to Marb1lry v.
Madison (1803), where Chief Justice John
Marshall deflected President Thomas
Jefferson's similar assault on judicial
independence. Of the Federalist Party,
which he had defeated in 1800, Jefferson
declared: "They have retired into the
judiciary as a stronghold. There the remains
of federalism are to be preserved and fed
from the treasury, and from that battery all
the works of republicanism are to be beaten
down and erased." Jeffersonians in Congress
responded by eliminating federal judgeships,
and also by impeaching a lower court judge
and a Supreme Court judge.
In Marb1t1y, Justice Marshall struck down
section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, thus
depriving his own court of the power to hear
a case against Secretary of State James
Madison. Marbury effectively declared that
the court would not stand in the way of the
new president or his congressional
majorities. So Jefferson won a shOli-term
political battle-but Justice Marshall won
the war by securing for the Supreme COUli
the power to declare federal laws
unconstitutional.
While some conservatives may think Justice
Robetis was following in Justice Marshall's
giant footsteps, the more apt comparison is
to the Republican Chief Justice Charles
Evans Hughes. Hughes's court struck down
the centerpieces of President Franklin
Roosevelt's early New Deal because they
extended the Commerce Clause power
beyond interstate trade to intrastate
manufacturing and production. Other
decisions blocked Congress's attempt to
delegate its legislative powers to federal
agencies.

FDR reacted furiously. He publicly
declared: "We have been relegated to a
horse-and-buggy definition of interstate
commerce." After winning a resounding
landslide in the 1936 elections, he responded
in February 1937 with the greatest attack on
the courts in American history. His
notorious court-packing plan proposed to
add six new justices to the Supreme COUli's
nine members, with the obvious aim of
overturning the court's opposition to the
New Deal.
After the president's plan was announced,
Hughes and Justice Owen 1. Roberts began
to switch their positions. They would vote to
uphold the National Labor Relations Act,
minimum-wage and maximum-hour laws,
and the rest of the New Deal.
But Hughes sacrificed fidelity to the
Constitution's original meaning in order to
repel an attack on the cOUli. Like Justice
Roberts, Hughes blessed the modern welfare
state's expansive powers and unaccountable
bureaucracies-the very foundations for
ObamaCare.
Hughes's great constitutional mistake was
made for nothing. While many historians
and constitutional scholars have referred to
his abrupt and unprincipled about-face as
"the switch in time that saved nine," the
court-packing plan was wildly unpopular
right from the start. It went nowhere in the
heavily Democratic Congress. Moreover,
further New Deal initiatives stalled in
Congress after the congressional elections in
1938.
Justice Roberts too may have sacrificed the
Constitution's last remaining limits on
federal power for very little-a little peace
and quiet from attacks during a presidential
election year.
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Given the advancing age of several of the
justices, an Obama second term may see the
appointment of up to three new Supreme
Court members. A new, solidified liberal
majority will easily discard Sebelills's limits
on the Commerce Clause and expand the
taxing power even further. After the Hughes
court switch, FDR replaced retiring Justices
with a pro-New Deal majority, and the court
upheld any and all expansions of federal

power over the economy and society. The
court did not overturn a piece of legislation
under the Commerce Clause for 60 years.
If a Republican is elected president, he will
have to be more careful than the last. When
he asks nominees the usual question about
justices they agree with, the better answer
should once again be Scalia or Thomas or
Alito, not Roberts.
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"Enumerating Conservatism's Long-term Victory"
The Boston Herald
July 1,2012
George F. Will
Conservatives won a substantial victory on
Thursday. The physics of American
politics-actions provoking re-actionscontinues to move the crucial debate, about
the nature of the American regime, toward
conservatism. Chief Justice John Roberts
has served this cause.
The health care legislation's expansion of
the federal government's purview has
improved our civic health by rekindling
interest in what this expansion threatensthe Framers' design for limited government.
Conservatives distraught about the survival
of the individual mandate are missing the
considerable consolation prize they won
when the Supreme Court rejected a
constitutional rationale for the mandateCongress' rationale-that was pregnant with
rampant statism.
The case challenged the court to fashion a
judicially administrable principle that limits
Congress' power to act on the mere pretense
of regulating interstate commerce. At least
Roberts got the court to embrace emphatic
language rejecting the Commerce Clause
rationale for penalizing the inactivity of not
buying insurance:
"The power to regulate commerce
presupposes the existence of commercial
activity to be regulated. . . . The individual
mandate, however, does not regulate
existing commercial activity. It instead
compels individuals to become active in
commerce by purchasing a product, on the
ground that their failure to do so affects
interstate
commerce.
Construing the
Commerce Clause to permit Congress to

regulate individuals precisely because they
are doing nothing would open a new and
potentially vast domain to congressional
authority .... Allowing Congress to justify
federal regulation by pointing to the effect
of inaction on commerce would bring
countless decisions an individual could
potentially make within the scope of federal
regulation, and-under the government's
theory-empower Congress to make those
decisions for him."
If the mandate had been upheld under the
Commerce Clause, the cOUli would have
decisively construed this clause so
permissively as to give Congress an
essentially unlimited police power-the
power to mandate, proscribe and regulate
behavior for whatever Congress deems a
public benefit. Instead, the court rejected the
Obama administration's Commerce Clause
doctrine. The court remains clearly
committed to this previous holding: "Under
our written Constitution ... the limitation of
congressional authority is not solely a matter
oflegislative grace."
The court held that the mandate IS
constitutional only because Congress could
have identified its enforcement penalty as a
tax. The cOUli thereby guaranteed that the
argument ignited by the mandate will
continue as the principal fault line in our
polity.
The mandate's opponents favor a federal
government as James Madison fashioned it,
one
limited
by
the
constitutional
enumeration of its powers. The mandate's
supporters favor government as Woodrow
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Wilson constmed it, with limits as elastic as
liberalism's agenda, and powers acquiring
derivative
constitutionality by being
necessary to, or efficient for, implementing
government's ambitions.
By persuading the court to reject a
Commerce Clause rationale for a president's
signature act, the conservative legal
insurgency against Obama-care has won a
huge victory for the long haul. This will help
revive a venerable tradition of America's
of viewing
political
culture,
that
congressional actions with a skeptical
constitutional
squint,
searching
for
congmence
with
the
Constitution's
architecture of enumerated powers. By
rejecting the Commerce Clause rationale,
Thursday's
decision
reaffirmed
the
Constitution's
foundational
premise:
Enumerated powers are necessarily limited
because, as Chief Justice John Marshall said,
"the enumeration presupposes something not
enumerated. "
When Nancy Pelosi, asked where the
Constitution authorized the mandate,
exclaimed, "Are you serious? Are you
serious?" she was utterly ingenuous. People
steeped in Congress' culture of unbridled

power find it incomprehensible that the
Framers fashioned the Constitution as a
bridle. Now, Thursday's episode in the
continuing debate about the mandate will
reverberate to conservatism's advantage. By
sharpening many Americans' constitutional
consciousness, the debate has resuscitated
the salutary practice of asking what was,
until the mid-1960s, the threshold question
regarding legislation. Is it proper for the
federal
government
to
do
this?
Conservatives can rekindle the public's
interest in this barrier by building upon the
victory Roberts gave them in positioning the
court for stricter scmtiny of congressional
actions under the Commerce Clause.
Any democracy, even one with a written and
revered constitution, ultimately rests on
public opinion, which is shiftable sand.
Conservatives understand the patience
requisite for the politics of democracy-the
politics of persuasion. Elections matter
most; only they can end Obamacare. But in
Roberts' decision, conservatives can see the
court has been persuaded to think more as
they do about the constitutional language
that has most enabled the promiscuous
expansion of government.
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"Chief Justice Roberts Signals That
Supreme Court Remains Independent"
The Los Angeles Times
June 30, 2012
David G. Savage
Despite widely held assumptions that he is
reliably conservative, Chief Justice John G.
Robetis Jr. ruled in favor of the Obama
administration on the new healthcare law and
Arizona's tough immigration law.

to load up the Supreme COUli with additional
justices appointed by him. The cOUli-packing
plan died in the Senate. The deft leadership by
Hughes preserved the court as an independent
institution.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. considers it
an insult when he hears it said that he and the
justices are playing politics. He has always
insisted his sole duty was to decide the law,
not to pick the political winners.

This year's court battle over the healthcare
law did not rise to the level of the New Dealera clash. But had the Roberts cOUli struck
down Obama's healthcare law, Democrats and
progressives would be making those historic
comparisons this week.

Until this week, however, not many were
inclined to believe him. Those on the leftand the right-were convinced they could
expect Roberts to be a reliable vote on the
conservative side.
But no more. The chief justice took control of
two of the biggest politically charged cases in
a decade, involving the Affordable Care Act
and Arizona's immigration law, and he
fashioned careful, lawyerly rulings that
resulted m victories for the Obama
administration.
Those who were surprised might have taken
note of the man Robetis describes as one of
his heroes-Chief Justice Charles Evan
Hughes, a progressive Republican who was
chief justice in the 1930s when President
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the court clashed
over the New Deal.
When the high court and the Roosevelt
administration seemed
headed for a
constitutional showdown, Hughes persuaded
one wavering justice to switch sides and vote
to uphold a minimum-wage law and a
collective bargaining measure. The "switch in
time that saved the nine" defused FDR's plan

"It was masterful. Roberts believes in a
modest role for the court, and he was doing
just what he promised he would do," said
Stanford
law
professor
Michael
W.
McConnell, a former appeals court judge
appointed by President George W. Bush. "Had
the court struck down the law, they would
have been the focal point of the campaign.
Now, the court comes out with its reputation
enhanced."

Acting on his own, Roberts saved the
Affordable Care Act from being struck down
as unconstitutional before it could go into
effect. His four fellow conservatives had voted
in favor of Republican state officials to void
the Democrats' healthcare measures that were
decades in the making.
Roberts, however, found a narrow way to
uphold the law as an exercise of Congress'
taxing power. "Because the Constitution
permits such a tax, it is not our role to forbid
it, or to pass upon its wisdom or fairness," he
wrote in an opinion joined in part by the
four liberal justices.
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And in the immigration dispute between
Arizona and the Obama administration,
Roberts led a 5-3 majority Monday that said
federal officials, not the states, had "broad
discretion" in deciding whether to arrest and
deport illegal immigrants. The ruling blocked
Republican-led states from moving to
aggressively enforce immigration laws on
their own.
The message from Roberts was that the high
court, even in a heated election year, was an
independent institution and an enforcer of the
Constitution-not a friendly forum for just
one party or one side of the ideological divide.
But no one should expect that Roberts has
moved left. Next term, the court will take on
college affirmative action and possibly gay
marriage, and Roberts is likely to take a
conservative stand.
Still, this week's rulings surprised much of
Washington, where the partisan divide is so
deep that few anticipated a nonpartisan
decision. Republican leaders had been
preparing to celebrate the demise of Obama's
healthcare law. Because the court had five
Republican appointees, their assumption was
the law would go down on a 5-4 vote.
Counting the same votes, Democrats and
liberal groups were prepared to launch a
political campaign against what they would
describe as the pro-business, right-wing
Roberts court.
The healthcare ruling would be paired with
Citizens United, the 2010 decision that led to a
gusher of new political spending.
In that case Roberts, with some hesitation,
joined a 5-4 opinion written by Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy that extended freespeech rights to corporate groups and unions.
At first, Roberts tried to fashion a narrow
ruling that would have allowed Citizens

United, a small nonprofit group, to sell a DVD
that derided Hillary Rodham Clinton, then a
Democratic candidate for president. But
Kennedy insisted on a much broader opinion
that struck down the long-standing ban on
campaign spending. Roberts then joined to
make the majority.
This time, by contrast, the chief justice kept
control of the healthcare opinion. With four
conservatives on his right and four liberals on
his left, he chose the narrow, middle-ground
ruling. He agreed with the conservatives it was
unconstitutional to "compel" Americans to
buy products, but he also agreed with the
liberals that the insurance mandate could be
upheld as a tax.
Kennedy, ousted from his spot at the center of
the action, delivered an angry, stinging dissent
Thursday that accused the chief justice of
"vast overreaching" and having "invented" a
way to uphold the law.
Constitutional experts said that when
considering what was at stake, the chief justice
deserves enormous credit.
Harvard Law School professor Richard
Lazarus, who has known Roberts since their
student days, said Thursday's opinion shows
he "does what he thinks is the right
interpretation of the law, not what he thinks is
necessarily popular or to curry favor."
Conservatives said they were disenchanted.
"Make no mistake: Chief Justice Roberts'
opinion is a sellout of constitutional principle
of the highest magnitude," said Chapman
University law professor John Eastman.
For his part, the chief justice said he was glad
to leave Washington for a summer teaching
trip to Malta. It's "an impregnable island
fortress," he told a group of judges Friday,
tongue in cheek. "It seemed like a good idea."
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"The Mystery of John Roberts"
The Ney\l York Times
July 11,2012
Linda Greenhouse
In November 1991, the Supreme Court
heard argument in Lee v. Weisman, on the
question of whether a prayer recited by a
member of the clergy at a public high school
graduation violated the constitutional
separation of church and state. The vote
after argument was 5 to 4 to allow the
prayer. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
gave the opinion-writing assignment to
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy.

the unusual move of filing a brief asking the
court to take the case, even though as a legal
matter the federal government's interest in
the outcome was far- fetched. As an
administration official explained to me at the
time, the strategy was to provide a vehicle
for Justice Souter to declare himself
lowering the church-state barrier (a
profound misjudgment of this Yankee
Republican, who voted with the majority).

Some months later, Justice Kennedy sent a
note to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, the
senior justice on the dissenting side. He had
changed his mind, Justice Kennedy said; the
argument against allowing the prayer was
the better interpretation of the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause. Justice
Blackmun, now the senior justice in the
majority, had the prerogative of reassigning
the opinion. He told Justice Kennedy to keep
writing.

Justice Kennedy's position was patiicularly
galling across the conservative spectrum: the
wounds from the 1987 defeat of Robert H.
Bork's nomination were still raw, and
Justice Kennedy held the seat the Reagan
administration had intended for Robert
Bork.

When the 5-to-4 decision to prohibit
graduation prayers was finally announced on
June 24, 1992, it was huge news. From
today's perspective, it may not sound like a
big deal. But Lee v. Weisman was one of the
hot-button cases of the 1991 term, perhaps
second only to Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, the abortion case that challenged the
continued validity of Roe v. Wade.
President George H. W. Bush was mnning
for re-election, and having put both David
H. Souter and Clarence Thomas on the
Supreme Comi, he was eager to show the
religious right that he was the rightful heir of
his predecessor, Ronald Reagan. His
solicitor general, Kenneth W. Starr, made

But did disappointed conservatives, inside or
outside the Supreme Court, run crying to the
press? They did not. The behind-the-scenes
drama remained largely unknown until
Justice BIackmun's papers became available
at the Library of Congress 12 years later.
Terry Eastland, writing in The American
Spectator in Febmary 1993, said there were
rumors suggesting that Justice Kennedy had
switched his position, but in the pre-Internet
age, the repmi received little traction. (There
were widespread rumors that in the Planned
Parenthood decision, issued five days after
Lee v. Weisman, Justice Kennedy had
switched his vote to join the 5-to-4 majority
in upholding the right to abortion, but my
own inside-the-court conversations at the
time refuted that suspicion.)
The obvious reason for this trip down
memory lane is to draw a then-and-now
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comparison with the torrent of right-wing
leaks in the immediate aftermath of the
decision to uphold the Affordable Care Act.
I'm not surprised by the claim that the
crucial vote by Chief Justice John G.
Roberts Jr. to uphold the health-care
mandate under the Congressional tax power
represented a late switch, having suggested
that scenario myself in a column written the
day of the decision. But I'm amazed by the
leaks (to be clear, I had none) and by the
invective that continues to be heaped on the
chief justice.
Ramesh Ponnuru, a senior editor of National
Review and leading conservative blogger,
wrote that Chief Justice Roberts "acted less
like a judge than like a politician, and a
slippery one." Randy Barnett, a Georgetown
University law professor and intellectual
father of the Commerce Clause argument
against the statute, predicted on the Volokh
Conspiracy blog that "it's hard to imagine
Republican politicians citing John Roberts
as the type of justice they favor nominating
in the future" (odd, because the Robelis
opmlOn, actually accepting Professor
Barnett's Commerce Clause analysis, has
left liberals seriously alarmed about the
court's future direction on congressional
power). Clint Bolick, a leading libertarian
who advocates aggressive activism-sorry,
"engagement"-by the court to shrink
government power, wrote in The Wall Street
J01lrnal that "the upshot is that Chief Justice
Robelis has become a 'swing' justice on the
Supreme Court" and is no longer a "solid
conservative. "
Mr. Bolick also wrote that the chief justice's
supposed vote switch has the effect of
"magnifying the harm" of the decision. This
is a common theme of the conservative
critics, although why that should be the case
is not self-evident. One asserted reason for
concern is that the switch reveals the chief

justice's vulnerability-now and in the
future-to
blandishments
from
the
establishment to do the right thing, to care
about his reputation and that of the comi. I
think this notion is close to fatuous. The
chief justice is an astute student of history
whose
recreational
reading
includes
biographies of former chief justices. He
didn't need to be reminded by a handful of
liberal pundits and political leaders that
there was a lot riding on his role in this case.
I doubt there was a single reason for the
chief justice's
evolution
(I
know,
conservatives hate that word in the context
of Supreme Court justices' ideological
trajectories), but let me suggest one: the
breathtaking radicalism of the other four
conservative justices. The opinion pointedly
signed individually by Justices Kennedy,
Thomas, Antonin Scalia and Samuel A.
Alito Jr. would have invalidated the entire
Affordable Care Act, finding no one part of
it severable from the rest. This astonishing
act of judicial activism has received
insufficient attention, because it ultimately
didn't happen, but it surely got the chief
justice's attention as a warning that his
ostensible allies were about to drive the
Supreme Comi over the cliff and into the
abyss. (Extraneous question: Is the liberal
love affair with Anthony Kennedy-which
should have ended five years ago with his
preposterously patronizing opmlOn in
Gonzales v. Carhart, upholding the federal
Partial-Birth AbOliion Ban Act of 2003 and
suggesting that women are incapable of
acting in their own best interests-finally
over?)
Students of the court more interested in
seeking to understand rather than denounce
the chief justice's performance have offered
valuable insights in recent days. Steven M.
Teles, a political scientist at Johns Hopkins
University and author of the commendable
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"The Rise of the Conservative Legal
Movement," suggested in The Washington
Monthly that Chief Justice Roberts was not
comfortable with "sweeping uses of judicial
power to limit government." Professor Teles
said that while the chief justice was
"sympathetic" with his fellow conservatives,
he "simply lacks the taste for the jugular that
they have, either as a result of his role as
chief justice or his prudential sense of how
far it is reasonable for the court to go in
using its power."
A Harvard law student, Joel Alicea, in a
smart post on the conservative Web site The
Public Discourse, wrote that the health care
decision revealed "a clash between two
visions of judicial restraint and two eras of
the conservative legal movement." If Chief
Justice Robelis, nearly a generation younger
than Justices Scalia and Kennedy, in fact
represents the old form of legal
conservatism, in which the judicial role is to
salvage statutes if possible rather than
eviscerate them in the service of a bigger
agenda, that's a fascinating and highly
consequential development.
And it may be just such a fear that explains
the anger and angst, the willingness of the
leakers-as
opposed to disappointed
conservatives of an earlier era-to burn the
cOUli down in order to delegitimize one
whom they happily claimed as their own
only weeks ago. The fissures on the
conservative side of the court may already
be opening over how to approach next
term's big cases on affirmative action (scrap
it or confine it) and voting rights (declare the
landmark Voting Rights Act obsolete, and
therefore unconstitutional, or yield to the
nearly unanimous vote by which Congress

extended the law's Section Five for another
25 years). The first case is already on the
court's docket, and the other is on its way,
neither by happenstance. Both cases were
created by conservative interest groups,
primed and nurtured and pushed to the
Supreme Court on the assumption that the
moment for radical activism had finally
arrived.
Is John Roberts the new swing justice? I
have strong doubts. The man is conservative
to his bones. So the real question is what the
word "conservative" means in 2012 and the
decades ahead. And that's a mystery much
more important to solve than who leaked
and why.
Readers of this column know from my
regular references to Judge Richard Posner
of the federal appeals court in Chicago that
he is one of my favorite judges. A pragmatic
libertarian and prolific author, Judge Posner
has the enviable quality of being willing to
say out loud exactly what he thinks. So his
comment on what may lie ahead for John
Roberts, in a July 5 interview with Nina
Totenberg of NPR, was perhaps not
surprising, but 1 still found it amazing. Here
is what he said:
"I mean, what would you do if you were
Roberts? All of a sudden you find out that
the people you thought were your friends
have turned against you, they despise you,
they mistreat you, they leak to the press.
What do you do? Do you become more
conservative? Or do you say, 'What am 1
doing with this crowd of lunatics.' Right?
Maybe you have to reexamme your
position. "
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"Analysis: Roberts Sent Message of Court's Legitimacy"
The Washington Post
June 30, 2012
Dan Ba1z

Chief Justice John Roberts delivered more
than a historic ruling with his opinion
upholding the constitutionality of the
Affordable Care Act. Deliberately or not, he
sent a message to politicians about the
impOliance of protecting the vitality and
reputation of public institutions.
That's a message badly needed III
Washington and nowhere more so than in
the Capitol building that sits across the
broad lawn from the Supreme Court.
Congress is an institution designed to
represent the people. It has become a body
where too often its members act as if they
represent only Republicans or only
Democrats. No wonder so many Americans
hold it in such low regard.

It is useful to remember that, in the run up to
the ruling, one strong subtext of analysis
was what a decision striking down President
Obama's health-care law would do to the
court itself. Would the court, under those
circumstances, be vulnerable to the charge
that it had become as politicized as the other
branches of government?
Connecting the dots
Fearing defeat, Democrats were preparing to
make the court a target in the fall election.
They were connecting the dots, from the
ruling that handed the presidency to George
W. Bush, to the Citizens United decision
that helped unleash a torrent of big-money
contributions in this year's election cycle (a
huge share of the money going to GOP
super PACs), and, finally, to health care and
a decision that would have been seen as

toppling
the
accomplishment.

president's

signature

No Supreme Court is ever immune from the
political currents swirling at any given time.
But the assumption of most Americans is
that the court, of the three branches of
government, should be insulated from
partisan politics. Its decisions may offend
one side or the other, but its legitimacy
should remain inviolate.
Had a majority of the justices struck down
Obamacare, the court-fairly or unfairlywould have become a bigger issue in the
presidential campaign than usual and in
ways that could have been damaging to its
authority.
How much the court's place and reputation
entered into Roberts' thinking may never be
known. Someday, the full story of how he
found his way to writing a majority opinion
on the health-care case with the four liberal
justices may become known. The opinion he
wrote was, in the estimation of some legal
experts, either tortured or fiendishly clever
in maneuvering toward an outcome that
upheld the constitutionality of the health
care law while attempting to adhere to
conservative principles aimed at restraining
the powers of the federal government.
One can only imagine how Obama, the
former
constitutional
law
professor,
analyzed the opinion and how he evaluated
the motivations of the chief justice who,
surprising to some, handed him a major
legal and political victory in the middle of
his tight re-election campaign.
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A particularly testy relationship

That was all the more intriguing because the
president and the chief justice have had a
particularly testy relationship. It began with
Obama's speech outlining his opposition to
Roberts' nomination in 2005. He said
Roberts had the intellect and temperament to
sit on the court but questioned whether he
had the values and healt not to side with the
strong over the weak.
Their relationship may have reached its
nadir when Obama publicly rebuked Roberts
and the court for the Citizens United
decision as the justices sat before him in the
House chamber during his 2010 State of the
Union address.
Roberts' detractors believe that he
reinterpreted what Congress said in the
legislation to find a legal justification for
upholding it-by defining the individual
mandate as a tax. For that, he is taking
considerable heat from conservatives. But he
also handed Republicans a new justification
to attack Obama for raising taxes.
Roberts wrote that he was not making a
judgment about the wisdom of the policy; he
said only that it was constitutionally
permissible. He has thrown the debate over

health care back into the political arena.
Those who looked to the court to redress
political grievances over a health-care law
that was passed on a party-line vote have the
oppOltunity to win their case in the court of
public opinion, which is the right place
given all its history.
In his act of judicial activism, as some of his
cntlcs
have
described
it,
Roberts
demonstrated restraint of a different kind-a
bow to the political branches of government
to exercise their powers within the broad
framework of the Constitution. If it was
judicial activism, it was in the service of
institutional deference. The chief justice
helped remind the country that each branch
of government has particular powers,
responsibilities
and
obligations.
The
legislative branch is designed for partisan
debate but, ultimately, it is there to make
laws and solve problems that it alone can
solve.
On one of the most politically charged cases
in years, the chief justice chose to exercise
the leadership that goes with his position. He
may have protected his institution at the
same time. The members of Congress have
not done that very often in recent years. That
is one lesson they can take away from the
court's historic ruling.
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"Constitution Check: What Does "Chief'
in "Chief Justice" Mean?"
National Constit1ltion Center
July 10,2012
Lyle Denniston
The statements at issue:
"His job is not to finesse the place of the
Supreme Court in the political world, in
which he and most justices are rank
amateurs, but to get the Constitution right
first and then defend the institution second."
- John Y00, law professor at the University
of California-Berkeley, in an email message
published July 3 by The New York Times.
He was commenting on leaks to the news
media that Chief Justice John G. Roberts,
Jr., had switched positions from striking
down the new federal health care law to
upholding it.
"There is speculation in conservative circles
that Roberts had intended to strike down
Obamacare but flipped his position at the
last minute. We don't know if he was
suddenly convinced by his liberal colleagues
or simply had a failure of nerve."
- Marc A. Thiessen, fellow of the American
Enterprise Institute in Washington, in an oped column July 7 in The Washington Post,
commenting on the same news reports.
We checked the Constitution, and ...
The Chief Justice of the United States-that
is the correct title-is one of the few top
federal officials whose job was created
explicitly in the Constitution. By tradition,
the Chief is also the head of the judicial
branch and is its dominant administrator.
And, if the federal courts' reputation is
suffering, or those comis are under political
siege, it is to the Chief that the other

justices-and perhaps the nation's peoplelook for restoration of its stature, and maybe
its power, too.
After seven terms as Chief Justice, John G.
Roberts, Jr., probably has not had his
leadership tested as much as now. When he
returns
from
a two-week teaching
assignment in Malta, and retreats to his
summer home in Maine, he almost celiainly
will start thinking about that challenge, and
whether he needs to do something about it.
He can have no doubt that many
conservative politicians, pundits, and
academics are thoroughly displeased with
his votes in the health care case. (When
those tempers cool, though, they will
discover on closely reading his opinion that
Chief Justice Roberts has not abandoned any
of his conservative philosophy, and, indeed,
has given a strong push to the limited
government sentiment that now runs so
deeply in conservative circles.)
But the Chief Justice's problem, if he has
one right now, is not solely with
conservative critics outside the Court. It now
appears that the internal deliberations of the
Court were the subject of very substantial
leaks from inside, and those leaks were
framed in a way that challenged his
leadership in fashioning a majority to
resolve
the
Affordable
Care
Act
controversy. Mr. Thiessen's comment in The
Post that the Chief Justice may have
suffered "a failure of nerve" is an echo of
what the leaks had indicated was an internal
complaint, too.
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It is almost celiainly not in Roberts' power
to stop such leaks altogether. But, as the
Chief, he does have the prestige and the
rank-and perhaps the obligation-to lead the
Court back toward renewed collegiality and
common purpose. He is known to want to
keep the Court above politics, as much as
possible, and that may very well account for
the way he voted on health care. He almost
surely is fully aware of the criticism that the
Roberts Court is a partisan bastion, but now,
the sniping from inside might just reinforce
such an image-unless the Chief moves to
ease the tension.
But dealing with that is an internal task;
Roberts also faces a task that involves the
world outside the Court, and not just to woo
back America's conservatives.
Although Professor Y00 sought to lecture
the Chief Justice on his priorities, that
critique suffered from two flaws. First,
there was no "right" way to decide the
health care case; that the Court was deeply
divided on almost all parts of the ruling
showed that mature minds can differ on
basic questions of constitutionality. The
Court is not "wrong" just because it
displeases some of the public.
Second, because the Chief Justice is the
public face of the court, he must have a
highly developed sensitivity to when it is
getting into political trouble. A Chief Justice

must be constantly aware of that in the
digital age, when a negative response to the
court can go viral instantly.
As a student of the court's history, Roberts
surely is aware of what may have been the
finest moment in the career of one of his
predecessors. And, despite Professor Y 00,
this previous Chief Justice did not consider
his external obligations to be secondary.
That Chief, of course, was Charles Evans
Hughes. In 1937, with the Court in the midst
of the constitutional cnSlS over its
independence of the White House, it was
Hughes' public and private maneuvering
that helped seal the doom of President
Franklin Roosevelt's COUli-packing plan.
Had that plan succeeded, it might well have
destroyed the Court.
In a column in The Nation magazine in May
1937, when the Roosevelt plan was going
down to defeat, columnist Robert S. Allen
wrote: "Few realize how important a part
Mr. Hughes has played in the fight against
the court bill. He has conducted his
operations with consummate deftness and
finesse-and tremendous effectiveness."
Hughes did it, though, with the suppOli of
his colleagues. The leaks from within the
Roberts Court do raise some doubt about
whether this Chief can count on solidarity
from within.
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